RFC Seraing v FIFA: Resetting the Boundaries of CAS Arbitration within the EU Legal Order
It was with much anticipation (see our previous news item posted on 3 April 2025) that the international legal and sporting communities awaited the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the case of RFC Seraing v FIFA (Case C-600/23), handed down on 1 August 2025. The case posed a delicate and timely question: to what extent may arbitral awards rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) be subject to review by national courts within the European Union?
The CJEU answer — framed, of course, within the logic and priorities of the European Union (EU) legal order — was characteristically nuanced.
It confirmed that, whilst CAS awards remain binding, they may indeed be reviewed by EU Member State courts — but only where such awards touch upon matters of EU public policy.
The ruling thus preserves, at least in theory, the efficiency and uniformity that international sports arbitration provides, whilst gently reaffirming the primacy of EU foundational legal principles. One naturally wonders, then: does EU competition law fall within this notion of public policy? The answer, in our opinion, is a most confident yes!
To understand why, one must look to the very heart of the European project. The EU commitment to ensuring fair and undistorted competition within its internal market is neither incidental nor peripheral, it is structural. Enshrined in Articles 101 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), EU competition law forms a legal architecture designed to safeguard the freedom of economic activity across Member States.
It is not merely about regulating markets; it is also about preserving the integrity of the single market itself. Whether by preventing collusive agreements, curbing abuses of dominant positions, or scrutinising mergers that reduce competition, these rules serve to protect not only businesses, but also consumers and the broader economic fabric of the EU and underpin the four freedoms in the EU single market, enshrined in the EU Treaties: movement of goods, services, capital and people.
Moreover, the EU vigilant control of state aid ensures that public subsidies do not distort the playing field. This too is a central pillar of EU public policy. The European Commission, entrusted with enforcement, possesses wide investigatory powers and may impose meaningful penalties. These mechanisms ensure that the rules are not merely symbolic, but operationally effective.
And we should not forget the delicate interplay between EU and national competition law. Although supranational in nature, EU competition law does not exist in splendid isolation. It operates in close dialogue with domestic systems, underpinned by mechanisms of coordination and mutual recognition.
It becomes abundantly clear, then, that EU competition law is far more than a regulatory scheme; it is a cornerstone of the EU constitutional identity. And for that reason, it forms an integral part of EU public policy.
A note of institutional response deserves mention. In a Media Statement, issued on the day of the CJEU judgment, the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS), the Governing Body of CAS acknowledged the CJEU decision, noting that, whilst CAS awards have traditionally been subject to review by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the CJEU judgment confirms that, when such awards concern matters of EU public policy, they must also be open to review by EU national courts. ICAS observed that the CJEU did not follow the Advocate General’s more expansive approach, instead limiting the scope of judicial review to public policy matters alone.
Notably, ICAS also reaffirmed the legitimacy of sports arbitration as a mechanism ensuring the consistent application of sporting rules, and emphasised the CAS continued commitment to providing “timely and expert dispute resolution worldwide.” The implications are undeniable: the once self-contained regime of final and binding CAS awards now finds itself drawn — however reluctantly — into the gravitational field of EU constitutional law.
The CJEU judgment in RFC Seraing draws a bright line between arbitral autonomy and judicial authority. The CAS, although seated in Lausanne, Switzerland, and revered in the sporting world, cannot stand apart from the EU legal order when its awards concern economic activity within the EU.
The CJEU acknowledged the virtues of arbitration, its expertise, efficiency, and global reach. But it also observed that, when recourse to arbitration is in practice unilaterally imposed, as is the case under the FIFA regulatory regime, the apparent voluntariness may be more fiction than fact. In such contexts, the right to effective judicial protection under EU law must remain a real guarantee.
To that end, the CJEU held that an arbitral award, which has not been subject to judicial review by a national court empowered to refer questions to the CJEU, cannot be granted the authority of res judicata within the EU, at least not when the award involves rules and principles that belong to the realm of public policy.
The implications are significant. The principle of res judicata, so vital to the finality and stability of arbitral awards, must now yield to the primacy of judicial review. Even the probative value of such awards vis-à-vis third parties must be withheld, unless and until compliance with EU public policy has been properly assessed.
At its core, the CJEU judgment in RFC Seraing affirms that the legal requirement to review compliance with EU public policy is not optional, nor contingent upon the procedural stance of the parties. It is, rather, a structural guarantee: one that exists to enable the individual concerned to exercise their right to an effective remedy and to enjoy the level of judicial protection that must be ensured, where appropriate, even ex officio, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.
And if national law — however elegantly drafted or long-standing — obstructs this duty, then it must be disapplied. The CJEU judgment is unequivocal: the full effectiveness of EU law takes precedence, even over the cherished doctrines of res judicata and procedural autonomy.
Yet this principled stance is not without consequence. What was framed as a plea for fairness by RFC Seraing has culminated in a structural destabilisation of the CAS enforcement regime within the EU. Finality, once the crown of sports arbitration, must now share its throne with judicial oversight. The result is a legal landscape more fragmented, and perhaps less predictable, than before.
And so, we return to the question posed at the outset: was this truly a victory for RFC Seraing?
It is, on paper, a victory — although one that carries with it the quiet weight of unintended consequences, likely to be felt well beyond the confines of the Belgian courts.
It also raises a broader question: how long can the EU maintain its attractiveness as a legal forum for the resolution of international sporting disputes? The EU commitment to rights and legal coherence is admirable, but if the enforcement of arbitral awards becomes mired in judicial review and procedural divergence, global actors may begin to look elsewhere — not in protest, but in quiet search of certainty.
After all, in law, as in life, attractiveness is never self-sustaining: it must be nurtured — deliberately, and with care….
We act in national and international sports-related disputes, including ones before National Courts, the CAS, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court and the CJEU, and further information is available by email from either Dr Estelle Ivanova or Dr Lucien Valloni, at ivanova@valloni.ch and valloni@valloni.ch respectively.