COLLECTIVE SALE OF SPORTS BROADCASTING RIGHS IN THE EU
For decades, the collective sale of sports broadcasting rights has been promoted as a fair and efficient model, capable of supporting both elite and grassroots levels of European sport. Leagues often adopt a centralized marketing model, selling broadcasting rights on behalf of their member clubs to maximize revenue and ensure a consistent product offering.
In practice, two competing models shape the way broadcasting rights are sold in the European sports market.
On the one side, the individual selling model allows each club to act independently, negotiating its own deals with broadcasters. Whilst this can promote competition and potentially boost revenues for the bigger clubs, it often leads to unequal revenue distribution and fragmented broadcasting coverage.
On the other side, the collective selling model allows a more coordinated approach where the league or governing body sells the broadcasting rights as a single package on behalf of all participating clubs. Revenues are then shared based on criteria established in advance, such as league rankings, viewership, or historical performance – the so-called ‘trickle-down effect’.
This second model has become the standard in most top-tier football competitions, including the UEFA Champions League (Case AT.37398, UEFA Broadcasting Rights, European Commission Decision, 23 July 2003), the English Premier League (Case AT.38173, Joint Selling of the Media Rights to the Premier League, European Commission Decision, 22 March 2006) and Germany’s Bundesliga (Case AT.37214, Central Marketing of the Media Rights of the German Football League European Commission Decision, 19 January 2005).
Each of these arrangements has been reviewed by the European Commission under Article 101 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), with specific commitments required to ensure transparency, competitive bidding, and limited exclusivity.
In short, in these landmark decisions, the European Commission set out the key conditions under which the collective sale of sport broadcasting rights may be considered compatible with EU competition law. Firstly, the arrangement must result in tangible efficiency gains, such as improved marketing, cost savings, and increased revenues that benefit all the participating clubs. Secondly, the arrangement must also avoid unduly restricting competition amongst broadcasters or limiting access to the rights, thereby preserving consumer choice and market openness. Finally, the entire sales process must be conducted in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner, ensuring that all the interested broadcasters have a fair opportunity to bid through open and impartial tender procedures.
In the UEFA Champions League case (Case AT.37398), the European Commission raised concerns that joint selling of media rights on an exclusive basis restricted competition and access to content, particularly for emerging markets like internet and mobile platforms. Following a formal Statement of Objections, UEFA submitted a revised model in 2002, which the Commission preliminarily endorsed. The new arrangement split rights into 14 smaller packages, limited exclusivity to three-year periods, introduced transparent public tenders, and allowed clubs to exploit individually unsold or deferred rights (for example, after Thursday midnight).
As the then EU Competition Commissioner Mario Monti noted, this settlement represented “good news for clubs, broadcasters and fans” and illustrated how EU law could accommodate the specific character of sport whilst ensuring compliance with Article 81(3) EC Treaty (now Article 101(3) TFEU).
Early legal commentary considered the collective sale of broadcasting rights to be broadly compatible with EU competition law, as long as key safeguards were in place, notably efficiency gains, proportionality, and transparent, non-discriminatory tendering procedures.
The European Commission accepted this model in a series of landmark cases: UEFA Champions League, Premier League, and Bundesliga, subject to commitments ensuring market access and limited exclusivity. These early decisions established a framework where solidarity and fair distribution justified limited restrictions of competition, especially when smaller clubs were able to benefit from shared revenues.
The debate on the legality of collective selling has gained renewed relevance in light of the CJEU (Court) judgment in the European Super League case (C-333/21). Whilst the ruling did not address sports broadcasting rights directly, it firmly reiterated that any restriction affecting the structure or functioning of a competitive market must be grounded in clearly defined objectives, applied in a proportionate manner, and supported by robust evidence. The Court judgment confirmed that arrangements granting UEFA and FIFA exclusive control over the exploitation of sports broadcasting rights may restrict competition by ruling out alternative commercial models that clubs or third-party organisers might otherwise adopt. Such restrictions may fall within the scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but they can still be justified if they meet certain strict conditions.
These conditions include demonstrating that the arrangements genuinely generate efficiency gains; that they ensure a fair redistribution of the resulting profits in the spirit of solidarity; and that the overall framework is proportionate in both design and effect. The Court made clear that the benefits of centralised sales must be real, concrete and supported by solid evidence. This includes financial and accounting data showing that all the stakeholders – professional and amateur clubs, players, broadcasters, viewers, and the wider public – truly benefit from the arrangement.
The justification must not rely on theoretical assumptions or general policy arguments. Instead, it must rest on demonstrable facts and transparent mechanisms, particularly regarding how rights are packaged and sold; the duration and exclusivity of contracts; and the accessibility of bidding procedures. The Court judgment thus introduces a heightened standard of accountability. What was once accepted as valid on principle must now be objectively proven. This evolution signals a shift towards greater legal and economic scrutiny of long-standing governance models in European sport.
Recent legal commentary has raised concerns that the efficiency and solidarity arguments traditionally used to justify UEFA’s collective selling model remain largely theoretical. These justifications, formulated over two decades ago, may no longer meet the evidentiary and analytical standards required under the current EU competition law framework. In the absence of updated empirical assessments, the continued permissibility of such models is increasingly open to challenge.
This tension highlights the growing uncertainty surrounding the continued legal permissibility of collective selling arrangements. Without renewed, evidence-based assessments of their actual market impact, models like UEFA’s may no longer satisfy the strict requirements of EU competition law. As the legal and economic context evolves, so too must the justifications underpinning these practices.
Whilst collective selling has long contributed to the financial stability and organisational coherence of European football, it now faces significant legal and policy challenges. EU institutions may soon be called upon to re-evaluate whether this model genuinely promotes competition, consumer choice, and the European Union’s internal market values.
In this shifting environment, sports organisations and regulators alike must reflect on whether the collective sale of rights remains compatible with the realities of today’s broadcasting ecosystem, or whether updated, evidence-based models are required to meet the demands of fairness, efficiency, and legal certainty in the digital age.
We advise on sports broadcasting rights, including their marketing and selling, and any corresponding disputes, and further information is available from Dr Estelle Ivanova, by emailing her at ivanova@valloni.ch