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CAS AWARD ON TRAINING COMPENSATION IN INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL

The 2025/A/11503 Award (the Award) rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in the case of Real Monarchs Football Club v. Potenza Calcio S.r.l. & Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), on 26 August 2026, confirms the importance of a substantive assessment of the relationships between football entities when applying the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players in force in July 2022 (the FIFA Regulations) on training compensation.

The legal separation of two entities is not, per se, sufficient to exclude the possibility that they may be regarded as a single club for the purposes of the FIFA Regulations. Their actual organisation, control relationships, sporting management, infrastructure and player development pathways must also be examined.

The Award further provides useful guidance on the evidentiary requirements for establishing a waiver of rights and on the distinction between professional contractual status and the completion of a player’s training.

The Award does not establish an automatic rule applicable to all multi-club structures. Its interpretative value lies, instead, in the assessment methodology adopted: a case-specific analysis based on the totality of the available evidence and guided by the purposes of the FIFA Regulations.

The Award provides useful guidance on the circumstances in which two football entities, although formally and legally distinct, may be regarded as a single club for the purposes of the FIFA Regulations. It also clarifies the conditions under which a statement, denying the existence of a claim, may be construed as a waiver of the underlying right.

The Award addressed both issues in the context of a dispute concerning training compensation allegedly due to Potenza Calcio in respect of the period during which the player Gennaro Michael Nigro was registered with the Italian club prior to his international transfer.

The dispute primarily concerned the relationship between Real Monarchs Football Club, competing in MLS NEXT Pro, and Real Salt Lake, a club competing in Major League Soccer (MLS). CAS upheld the obligation to pay training compensation, together with interest, and dismissed Real Monarchs’ appeal.

The Award is of interest beyond the specific circumstances of the case. In particular, it examines the relationship between corporate separateness and the actual organisation of sporting activities, offering relevant guidance for football groups operating through several legal entities and for the protection of training clubs.

CAS applied the FIFA Regulations as the primary source of law and Swiss law on a subsidiary basis. As regards the merits, CAS identified the version of the FIFA Regulations, at the time of the relevant events, as the applicable substantive framework, distinguishing it from procedural provisions that subsequently entered into force.

The first point of interest concerns standing to appeal.

The FIFA decision under appeal was formally addressed to Real Salt Lake, whereas the appeal had been lodged by Real Monarchs. CAS nevertheless recognised the latter’s standing, noting that the reasoning underlying the FIFA decision had directly affected its legal position by treating it as part of the same club as Real Salt Lake and, consequently, linking it to the financial obligation in dispute.

The reasoning correctly distinguishes between two separate issues: on the one hand, whether the appellant has a direct and concrete interest in challenging the decision and, on the other, whether the two entities should, in fact, be regarded as a single club.

The second issue cannot be determined in advance for the purpose of denying the first. A decision may have concrete effects on a party’s legal position even where that party is not formally identified as its addressee.

This principle is also relevant from a procedural perspective. In sports-related disputes, consideration must be given not only to the operative part of a decision, but also to the legal consequences arising from its reasoning.

The central issue addressed in the Award concerns the interpretation of the concept of a club for the purposes of training compensation.

CAS first clarified that two separate legal entities may be regarded as a single club for the purposes of applying the FIFA Regulations. It then examined whether this was the case with regard to the relationship between Real Monarchs and Real Salt Lake.

The separate corporate existence of the two entities was not disputed. However, CAS considered that, for regulatory purposes, the concept of a club must be interpreted by reference to the actual organisational and sporting arrangements, rather than solely to its legal structure.

This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of training compensation: to reward clubs that have contributed to a player’s training and development and to prevent the organisation of youth activities, through formally separate entities, from undermining the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism established by the FIFA Regulations.

In the present case, CAS considered several factors, assessed cumulatively:

§the documentation recorded in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), which referred to Real Salt Lake;

§common ownership and shared governance;

§the use of the same training facilities;

§the integration of Real Monarchs into the player development pathway leading to the first team; and

§Real Salt Lake’s ability to benefit from the sporting services of players developed through Real Monarchs.

CAS also considered the factors supporting the alleged independence of the two entities, including separate bank accounts, distinct visual identities, different stadiums and independent salary structures. However, these circumstances were not considered sufficient to outweigh the overall degree of organisational and sporting integration.

It is important to note that CAS did not regard common ownership, per se, as decisive. Its conclusion was based on an overall assessment of the relationship between the two entities.

Of particular significance is the fact that CAS did not consider it necessary to establish fraudulent intent or a specific intention to circumvent the FIFA Regulations. Its analysis focused instead on the substance of the organisational relationship and on the ability of the main club to benefit from the services of players developed by the other entity.

The Award, therefore, provides important guidance for football organisations which are structured through several legal entities: corporate separation does not, per se, preclude those entities from being treated as a single club for the purposes of the FIFA Regulations.

The Award also contains relevant findings from an evidentiary perspective.

CAS attached particular importance to the documentation available in the TMS and to information published on the clubs’ official websites.

Real Monarchs had argued that the use of a single TMS account was motivated exclusively by administrative considerations and did not demonstrate the existence of sporting integration. CAS did not dismiss this explanation, in principle, but noted the absence of supporting documentation capable of establishing the operational independence claimed by Real Monarchs.

Statements published on the clubs’ official websites also played a role in the assessment. In particular, Real Monarchs was presented as part of Real Salt Lake’s player development pathway. CAS regarded these statements as relevant evidence of how the sporting organisation actually operated.

The practical implication is clear: a club seeking to establish its independence cannot rely solely on corporate documents and registration certificates.

It must be able to demonstrate its managerial, financial and sporting autonomy in practice. In the present case, for example, CAS noted the absence of invoices, bank statements and agreements evidencing payment of the alleged consideration for the shared use of training pitches.

A further issue concerned the interpretation of a communication sent by Potenza’s General Secretary.

In that message, it was stated that no training compensation was payable on the basis of a regulatory provision which CAS subsequently held to be inapplicable to the transfer to the United States.

Real Monarchs relied on that statement, arguing that Potenza had waived its right to training compensation.

CAS rejected this interpretation, stating that a claim does not exist is not necessarily equivalent to waiving that claim. The communication expressed an incorrect legal assessment as to the existence of the entitlement but did not clearly and unequivocally demonstrate an intention to relinquish it.

This distinction is relevant to contractual practice and to the management of relations between football clubs. A waiver must be based on a sufficiently precise declaration of intent, leaving no reasonable doubt as to the intention to relinquish the right in question.

The sequence of events also contributed to the CAS conclusion. Both the contract and the request for the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) predated the communication. Furthermore, the formal waiver form subsequently sent to Potenza had never been signed or returned.

CAS did not hold that electronic communications are, as such, incapable of constituting a valid waiver, nor did CAS establish that a document signed by both parties is invariably required. Rather, the CAS analysis focused on the substance and clarity of the declaration.

CAS also rejected the argument that the player’s previous professional contract with Roma was, in itself, sufficient to establish that his training had been completed.

The mere existence of a professional contract was not considered decisive. There was no evidence that, prior to his transfer to Potenza, the player had made appearances for Roma’s first team or participated in official competitions above youth level.

The CAS required an overall assessment of the available evidence, placing the burden of proof on the appellant and applying the standard of comfortable satisfaction.

The underlying principle deserves attention: a player’s contractual status does not necessarily correspond to his actual level of sporting development.

Accordingly, in order to challenge a claim for training compensation, it is not sufficient to establish that the player has previously entered into a professional contract. It is necessary to provide concrete evidence of the player’s sporting career, appearances, call-ups and the level of the competitions in which he has participated.

CAS also considered the subsequent transfer from Roma to Potenza as an indication that the player still required further development. This was, however, an assessment based on the specific circumstances of the case, rather than a general rule according to which a transfer to a lower division automatically demonstrates that a player’s training has not been completed.

We advise on and represent clients in training compensation cases in Switzerkand and Itay and further information may be obtained from either our Managing Partner, Dr Lucien Valloni, or the Head of our Italian Law Practice, Avv. Sara Botti, by emailing them at valloni@valloni.ch or botti@valloni.ch respectively.