CASE NOTE: CAS 2025/A/11192 FC des Girondins de Bordeaux v. Real Sporting de Gijón SAD 28 November 2025
Introduction
The CAS (Court of Arbitration for Sport) award in FC des Girondins de Bordeaux v. Real Sporting de Gijón SAD (CAS 2025/A/11192, 28 November 2025) offers a particularly clear and methodical illustration of how procedural rigour governs the admissibility of appeals directed against decisions of the FIFA Football Tribunal formalised through the General Secretariat’s confirmation-letter mechanism.
The dispute arose from a transfer agreement concluded on 1 August 2023 for the permanent transfer of the player Pedro Díaz Fanjul from Real Sporting de Gijón SAD (Gijón) to FC des Girondins de Bordeaux (Bordeaux). Under the agreement, Bordeaux undertook to pay a total transfer fee of €2,250,000 (around Sw. Frs. 2,094,000) in three net instalments. Whilst the first instalment was duly paid, the second instalment of €800,000 (around Sw. Frs. 747,000), due on 15 July 2024, remained outstanding. Following an unsuccessful payment reminder and a default notice, Gijón initiated proceedings before the Players’ Status Chamber of the FIFA Football Tribunal.
On 24 January 2025, after the parties failed to contest a settlement proposal issued pursuant to Article 20 of the FIFA Procedural Rules, the FIFA General Secretariat formalised the proposal through a confirmation letter, thereby rendering a final and binding decision ordering Bordeaux to pay €1,500,000 (around Sw. Frs. 1,396,000), plus interest and a contractual penalty of €75,000 (around Sw. Frs. 69,840).
On 17 February 2025, Bordeaux lodged an appeal before CAS. The central issue before the Sole Arbitrator was, therefore, whether the appeal had been lodged within the twenty-one-day time limit prescribed by Article 50.1 of the FIFA Statutes, having regard to the date and modalities of notification via the FIFA Legal Portal.
On this point, the parties adopted sharply divergent positions. Bordeaux maintained that it had encountered technical difficulties in accessing the FIFA Legal Portal and had only received effective notification of the decision on 5 February 2025, such that the appeal was timely. Gijón, by contrast, argued that notification occurred upon upload of the decision to the portal on 24 January 2025, rendering the appeal manifestly out of time.
Beyond this procedural disagreement, the parties’ submissions also revealed a deeper substantive tension—between the Appellant’s reliance on French domestic insolvency proceedings as a source of legal impossibility and the Respondent’s invocation of pacta sunt servanda. The Sole Arbitrator, however, deliberately confined the analysis to the admissibility of the appeal, leaving that tension unresolved and reaffirming the primacy of procedural discipline as a guarantee of legal certainty.
Whilst the award is procedurally dense, the present Post does not seek to offer an exhaustive account of its reasoning. Rather, it focuses on five key procedural aspects which, taken together, merit particular attention for their practical significance.
- The Legal Framework for Computing Time Limits
The award treats admissibility as a threshold issue conditioning the Sole Arbitrator’s jurisdiction to examine the merits of the dispute (para 132). Relying primarily on Article 50.1 of the FIFA Statutes, which imposes a strict twenty-one-day time limit for appeals against final FIFA decisions and complemented by Article R49 of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration (CAS Code), the Sole Arbitrator confirmed that compliance with procedural deadlines constitutes a mandatory prerequisite to appellate review.
Reflecting a civil-law inspired formal approach, the reasoning is structured around the classical distinction between the dies a quo —the date on which the appeal period begins to run—and the dies ad quem, marking the final day for valid submission of the Statement of Appeal (para. 133).
To determine how the twenty-one-day appeal period is to be calculated, the Sole Arbitrator characterises the issue as one of admissibility—more precisely, of actionability—thus triggering the application of Article R58 of the CAS Code. In accordance with Article 49.2 of the FIFA Statutes, the method for calculating the time limit must, therefore, be determined primarily by reference to the applicable FIFA Regulations, and only subsidiarily by Swiss law.
Whilst emphasising that Article R32 of the CAS Code lays down general rules of considerable importance for time limits fixed by the CAS, the Sole Arbitrator recalled that the present case concerns the calculation of an appeal deadline established by a sports federation, and not by CAS itself. In such circumstances, the applicable method must be determined within the regulatory framework of the federation concerned—in this case, the FIFA Regulations—supplemented, where appropriate, by Swiss law (para. 138).
Within this framework, decisive weight was accorded to Article 11.1 of the FIFA Procedural Rules, which provides that the appeal period begins to run on the day following receipt of the decision, without excluding weekends or non-working days. This interpretation is further supported by Article 77 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, legal doctrine, and consistent CAS jurisprudence, confirming that no normative conflict arises and that the relevant rules converge towards a uniform method of calculation (paras. 139–142).
On the basis of this convergent framework, the rules governing the computation of the appeal deadline may be summarised as follows:
(i) as a matter of principle, the time limit starts on the day following receipt of the decision (dies a quo);
(ii) the calculation then runs continuously, including weekends and non-working days; and
(iii) by way of exception, postponement applies only where the final day (dies ad quem) falls on an official holiday or non-working day at the place where the appeal is to be filed.
Applying these principles to the present case, the dies a quo was fixed on 25 January 2025, with the dies ad quem falling on 14 February 2025. As Bordeaux lodged its Statement of Appeal on 17 February 2025, the appeal was declared out of time.
- Notification and the “Sphere of Influence” (Dies a Quo)
This aspect of the award turns on the determination of when a decision is deemed to have been “received” for the purposes of triggering the appeal period, in circumstances where notification is effected through the FIFA Legal Portal.
Having clarified the applicable rules governing the calculation of the appeal deadline, the Sole Arbitrator turned to the decisive issue of when the Appealed Decision must be deemed to have been validly notified, as this determines the dies a quo of the appeal period (para. 143).
Consistent with settled CAS jurisprudence and Swiss Federal Tribunal case law, the award recalls that the relevant point in time is receipt of the decision, not the addressee’s actual knowledge of its content (CAS 2004/A/574; CAS 2006/A/1153, para. 10; SFT 4A_89/2011) (para. 147).
In this respect, the concept of “receipt” is assessed on the basis of two cumulative requirements (para. 149): first, the decision must have entered the addressee’s sphere of influence; second, it must be reasonable, under the circumstances, to expect the addressee to take note of it (CAS 2019/A/6253, para. 82). Importantly, “actual knowledge” is not required.
Applying this standard, the Sole Arbitrator rejected the Appellant’s argument that notification occurred only on 5 February 2025 and concluded that the upload of the Appealed Decision to the FIFA Legal Portal on 24 January 2025 constituted valid notification. Consequently, the dies a quo was fixed on 25 January 2025, the day following receipt, pursuant to Article 11.1 of the FIFA Procedural Rules (para. 160).
- The Dies ad Quemand the Automatic Preclusive Effect of Late Appeals
Once the dies a quo had been established, the Sole Arbitrator proceeded to determine the final day for filing the Statement of Appeal. Given that the computation of the time limit includes weekends and non-working days, the appeal deadline expired on Friday, 14 February 2025 (paras. 161–162).
In determining the dies ad quem, the Sole Arbitrator drew a clear distinction between the automatic postponement of a deadline and any form of extension, the latter being expressly prohibited. Whilst Article 11.3 of the FIFA Procedural Rules—mirroring Article R32 of the CAS Code—allows the deadline to be carried over to the next working day where the final day coincides with an official public holiday or a non-working day at the Appellant’s domicile, no such circumstance was established in the present case (para 162).
The award further recalled that the appeal time limit cannot be extended under any circumstances, as Article R32 of the CAS Code expressly excludes any judicial discretion in this respect (para. 165).
- Burden of Proof and Alleged Technical Impediments
The Appellant argued that it was unable to access the Appealed Decision until 5 February 2025 due to confusion between two sets of access credentials and an alleged inability to view certain files. The Sole Arbitrator found that this argument failed at the level of proof.
The award adopted a strict allocation of the burden of proof. Whilst notification is presumed effective once a decision is uploaded to the FIFA Legal Portal, that presumption may be rebutted only if the Appellant demonstrates that it was genuinely prevented, for reasons beyond its control, from accessing the Portal and thus from becoming aware of the decision.
Applying this standard, the Sole Arbitrator concluded that the Appellant failed to discharge its burden. The alleged access difficulties concerned an unrelated FIFA matter and did not establish any objective impediment in the present proceedings (paras. 154–160). The award thus makes clear that allegations of technical impediments are not sufficient in themselves.
- The FIFA Legal Portal as a Vector of Procedural Certainty
Beyond the evidentiary outcome of the case, the award sheds light on the status of the FIFA Legal Portal within the procedural architecture of football disputes. The Portal is not treated as a mere technical interface, but as a legally operative channel of communication endowed with normative effect.
Pursuant to FIFA Circular 1842 of 6 April 2023, the use of the FIFA Legal Portal has been mandatory for clubs since 1 May 2023, with an express obligation to consult it on a daily basis. This requirement is reflected in Article 10 of the FIFA Procedural Rules, which designates the Portal as a valid and sufficient means of communication for the purpose of establishing procedural time limits (paras. 152–153). The Sole Arbitrator treated these obligations as strict and enforceable, reflecting a deliberate regulatory choice to anchor procedural certainty in digital communication.
Once a decision is uploaded to the FIFA Legal Portal, it is deemed to have entered the addressee’s sphere of influence, thereby triggering the relevant time limits irrespective of whether the message was actually opened or acknowledged. The procedural risk associated with non-consultation is thus expressly borne by the club.
At the same time, the award acknowledged that the presumption of notification is not irrebuttable. Exceptional circumstances beyond a club’s control may, in principle, displace it. However, such circumstances must be credibly demonstrated, in line with the regulatory logic that ties the commencement of time limits to the receipt of the communication, rather than to actual awareness of its content (para. 154).
By articulating these principles, the award confirms that technological formalism has become an integral component of the procedural framework governing football disputes. Clubs are, therefore, expected to adapt their internal organisation accordingly, failing which they will bear the resulting procedural consequences.
Conclusion
The FC Bordeaux v. Sporting de Gijón CAS award offers an instructive clarification of procedural formalism in CAS appeals. Its doctrinal value lies not in the substantive fate of the transfer dispute, but in its systematic articulation of how admissibility, notification, evidentiary burdens, and digital communication rules interact within the lex sportiva.
By affirming the binding force of the FIFA Legal Portal and maintaining a rigorous standard of procedural diligence, the award promotes predictability, transparency, and consistency—values essential to the credibility of international sports arbitration.
Notably, as mentioned, the Sole Arbitrator did not address the potential impact of the French redressement judiciaire (judicial recovery) proceedings on the enforceability of the underlying debt. Whilst the Appellant invoked domestic insolvency constraints as a potential bar to performance, the reasoning was confined strictly to the admissibility of the appeal, without engaging with the interaction between national insolvency law, FIFA regulatory framework, and the enforcement phase of sporting decisions. That question, therefore, remains open within the evolving landscape of international sports arbitration.
We act in CAS Appeals and further information is available from Dr Estelle Ivanova and Dr Lucien Valloni by e-mailing them at ivanova@valloni.ch and valloni@valloni.ch respectively.