COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT (CAS) REDRAWS THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FIFA FOOTBALL AGENT REGULATIONS (FFAR)
The recent CAS Award 2025/A/11173, Tullio Tinti v. FIFA, which was handed down on 22 October 2025, is poised to leave a significant mark on the regulation of the football agents’ market.
This is not so much because of the personal circumstances of the Italian football agent concerned, but rather because of the principle that it reaffirms: a measure labelled as “provisional” which lacks a defined duration and a competent authority for its review, ceases to be provisional and becomes, in substance, a final sanction devoid of any legal basis. In other words, the CAS has reiterated that provisionality is not an empty formula but a legal concept requiring time-boundedness and the guarantee of subsequent oversight.
To appreciate the reach of this decision, it is necessary to start from the relevant context. With the entry into force of the FFAR in 2023, the licensing system, once again, became central to the regulation of football agents. Amongst the eligibility requirements, Article 5 provides that an individual who has been subject to a suspension of two years or more for breaches of ethical or professional conduct standards cannot obtain, nor retain, a licence. The provision reflects an intention to elevate integrity standards; however, when applied automatically and without any proportionality safeguards, it risks turning into an insurmountable barrier.
This is precisely what happened in the Tinti case. In 2012, the agent accepted a FIGC (the Italian Football Federation) sanction of thirty-six months and a fine of €80,000 (around Sw.Frs.74,600) as part of a settlement with the federal prosecutor. Having served the suspension, Tinti resumed his professional activity and worked, for many years, without any further disciplinary issues. In 2023, FIFA issued him a licence, having verified his eligibility. Yet, in 2024, following an information update from the FIGC, the FIFA General Secretariat notified him that the 2012 sanction rendered him incompatible with Article 5 FFAR and, in January 2025, suspended his licence on a “provisional” basis.
The CAS upheld the intermediary’s appeal, not because it excluded in the abstract the relevance of a prior suspension, but because the decision suffered from a structural defect: the General Secretariat had acted ultra vires. The Regulations provide that the General Secretariat may investigate compliance and trigger an automatic provisional suspension, but the final decision lies with the FIFA Disciplinary Committee. And this is the crux of the matter: Article 21 FFAR, which allocates that competence, had been suspended. Nobody was able to convert the provisional measure into a final determination or to revoke it. In the absence of a temporal horizon and of a competent adjudicating authority, the suspension became, in effect, an indefinite and final measure. For the CAS, this is unacceptable. Provisionality is not a label but a guarantee: it presupposes a defined timeframe and the availability of review. Without such safeguards, the measure loses its provisional nature and becomes unlawful.
The CAS panel stressed that the General Secretariat cannot assume final decision-making powers. Its role is administrative, not disciplinary. It may form a “belief”, a preliminary view, but cannot convert it into a definitive determination. The CAS referred to the Beckett precedent (CAS 2024/A/10918 Jonathan Dominic Finbar Beckett v. FIFA), where it had already condemned the assumption of powers not conferred by the Regulations. Here, the situation was aggravated by the fact that the suspension was destined to continue sine die, with no provision for reconsideration. The CAS described this as an “institutional impasse” altering the legal nature of the measure.
Although the panel confined its analysis to the issue of competence, the Award leaves open several broader questions. The first concerns proportionality. The CAS noted that the General Secretariat failed to consider the time elapsed, the absence of recidivism, and the criminal acquittal relating to the 2012 events. These are factors that ought to have carried weight: an eligibility rule cannot be allowed to metamorphose into a perpetual penalty. The second concerns the systematic interpretation of Article 5. The provision refers to “suspension” yet does not clarify whether it encompasses settlement-based sanctions, such as the one imposed by the FIGC. Curiously, Article 5 expressly mentions “related settlements”, whereas the subsequent provision does not. This is a detail deserving attention, as the ratio of the rule is to target serious misconduct, not transactions concluded for procedural or strategic reasons.
The Tinti case also raises questions concerning the principle of non-retroactivity and ne bis in idem. The CAS did not address these issues, having disposed of the matter on competence grounds, but the debate remains open. Applying a 2023 provision to conduct from 2012 entails attaching new consequences to past events. FIFA argues that this is merely an assessment of present suitability rather than a retroactive sanction. Yet, when the effect is a de facto permanent exclusion, the distinction becomes tenuous. Similarly, ne bis in idem may arise where the measure assumes a punitive character. Finally, one must not overlook the personality-rights dimension. The CAS implicitly recalled the Matuzalem precedent (Ruling of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court of 27 March 2012): an indefinite prohibition on exercising one’s profession may amount to a serious infringement contrary to Swiss public policy.
From a practical perspective, the FIFA priority must be to address the vacuum created by the suspension of Article 21 FFAR. It must restore the functionality of the Disciplinary Committee or establish substitute mechanisms that ensure defined timelines and full adversarial process. It is also necessary to clarify the scope of relevant sanctions and to introduce principles of proportionality and rehabilitation. For football agents, the strategy is to challenge any suspension lacking a defined end date, to emphasise subsequent good conduct and criminal acquittals, and to invoke general legal principles as supplementary arguments.
We act in football agent cases, especially disputes, and further information is available, from Avv. Sara Botti, the Head of our Italian Law Practice, by emailing her at botti@valloni.ch.