FIFA FOOTBALL AGENT REGULATIONS AND EU COMPETITION LAW

 

In the world of professional association football, where multimillion-euro deals and global visibility are at stake, few figures are as influential, and as scrutinised, particularly from a legal point of view, as the sports agent. Behind every high-profile transfer or contract renegotiation lies the work of sports agents, who shape careers, structure deals, and steer negotiations in a fiercely competitive market.

At their core, sports agents serve as intermediaries between athletes and clubs, brokering agreements for the practice of sport as a paid activity. Whether arranging a player’s transfer, securing a new contract, or facilitating a move across borders, agents play a pivotal role in the employment and transfer system, particularly in team sports like football.

But their role does not stop there. Modern agents often take on a far broader portfolio of responsibilities, which may include negotiating commercial deals such as image rights, sponsorship and advertising contracts, or even managing an athlete’s financial affairs. In many cases, they serve as trusted advisers who provide strategic guidance across an athlete’s entire professional journey.

In short, sports agents especially football agents, have become integral players in the economic ecosystem of sport, connecting stakeholders and ensuring the smooth functioning of an increasingly complex marketplace.

In this context, FIFA introduced its latest Football Agent Regulations (FFAR), aiming to reform the football transfer system. The FFAR include provisions on agent remuneration, mandatory licensing, and the establishment of a FIFA-controlled clearing house to oversee financial transactions.

This regulatory framework is currently under close scrutiny within the European Union (EU). Critics argue that the measures restrict competition between agents and may also hinder the freedom of clubs to choose their representatives, raising potential concerns under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

FIFA, for its part, defends the Regulations as necessary to uphold the integrity, transparency, and efficiency of the transfer market. From its perspective, the FFAR seek to address structural imbalances and to professionalise the football agent profession, ultimately serving the broader interests of the sport.

The key legal issue now under examination is whether the FIFA regulatory framework complies with EU competition law, despite its potentially restrictive effects on economic freedoms, contractual autonomy, and the competitive structure of the market.

In a set of three separate but thematically related cases currently pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)—RRC Sports (C-209/23), ROGON and Others (C-428/23), and Tondela and Others (C-133/24)—Advocate General Nicholas Emiliou has delivered Opinions on 15 May 2025, addressing the compatibility of certain sports regulations with EU law.

The first two cases, RRC Sports and ROGON, concern rules governing the activities of football agents, including those introduced by the FIFA Football Agent Regulations. Both actions challenge aspects of these rules on the grounds that they may infringe EU competition law and the freedom to provide services. The third case, Tondela, whilst not about agents, addresses a related issue: whether an agreement  between clubs not to recruit certain players (‘no-poach’ agreement) amounts to a prohibited restriction of competition under EU law.

In his Opinions, Advocate General Emiliou proposes that the contested rules in RRC Sports and ROGON be assessed under the framework laid down in Meca-Medina (C-519/04 P). According to this case-law, certain restrictions of competition may nonetheless fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU if they pursue a legitimate objective in the public interest, and if the measures taken are both necessary and proportionate to achieving that objective.

Importantly, the Advocate General emphasises that the Meca-Medina test must be applied to each rule individually rather than to the regulatory framework as a whole. This means that even if the overarching aims of FIFA —such as enhancing transparency or protecting the integrity of transfers—are legitimate, each provision, such as the cap on agent fees or licensing requirements, must still be justified on its own merits.

In both RRC Sports and ROGON, the contested provisions relate to key aspects of the FFAR, including restrictions on agent remuneration, mandatory licensing schemes, and—in the case of RRC Sports—the use of a FIFA-controlled clearing house.

Rather than concluding that the FIFA Football Agent Regulations are incompatible with EU law, the Advocate General’s Opinions in RRC Sports and ROGON recommend a cautious, criteria-based examination of each individual rule. This reinforces the view that sports bodies are not exempt from competition law and must justify any restriction on economic freedoms by reference to legitimate, proportionate, and necessary objectives. This approach places the burden on FIFA to demonstrate the proportionality and necessity of each restriction under scrutiny.

More broadly, the Advocate General addresses the so-called ‘sporting exception’—the idea that certain sports-related rules may fall outside the scope of EU competition and internal market law. He clarifies that this exception is not absolute but rather reflects two well-established principles of EU law: first, that EU rules on competition and free movement apply, in principle, to economic activities; and second, that rules adopted by self-regulating bodies may fall outside the scope of EU competition and internal market law only if they have no appreciable economic effect.

In his view, EU law does allow sports bodies, such as FIFA, to regulate upstream or downstream markets, including the activities of football agents. However, where such rules have significant anticompetitive effects, they must be justified either under the Meca-Medina doctrine or through an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. In either case, the analysis must focus on whether the measures pursue legitimate objectives in the public interest and whether they are both proportionate and effective.

This cautious approach echoes the reasoning adopted by the CJEU in its 2023 decisions: European Superleague (C-333/21), Royal Antwerp (C-680/21), and ISU (C-124/21 P). In these landmark rulings, the Court reaffirmed that sports bodies, such as FIFA and UEFA, whilst serving a regulatory function, also act as undertakings and must, therefore, comply with EU competition law when their decisions affect economic activity. In particular, the CJEU held that regulatory autonomy must be framed by transparent, objective, and non-discriminatory criteria, especially when sports organisations combine rule-making powers with commercial interests. This jurisprudence provides important context for assessing the FFAR, as it signals a tightening of the boundaries within which sports bodies may self-regulate without infringing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. These judgments reiterate that Article 165 TFEU does not exempt sports rules from compliance with EU law, and that self-regulatory bodies must act within a clear legal framework when exercising market power.

It is worth recalling that, in July 2023, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) rendered an award (CAS 2023/O/9370), finding that the FFAR were compatible with both EU and Swiss competition law. Whilst this arbitral decision lends weight to the FIFA argument that the new legal framework is a necessary and proportionate response to systemic issues in the transfer market, it does not resolve the open questions under EU law.

Subsequently, in response to a preliminary injunction from the District Court of Dortmund issued on 24 May 2023—which targeted, amongst others, the cap on agent fees, the mandatory use of the FIFA Clearing House, and rules on double representation—FIFA opted to suspend the implementation of several key provisions of the FFAR for transfers linked to the European Union. To avoid regulatory fragmentation across jurisdictions, FIFA extended the suspension worldwide through Circular no. 1873 of 30 December 2023.

The responsibility now lies with the CJEU, whose forthcoming judgments in RRC Sports, ROGON, and Tondela are expected to clarify the legal boundaries within which international sports bodies may regulate economic activity.

It should be noted that Advocate General Opinions are not legally binding on the CJEU but are often influential in shaping the CJEU reasoning and rulings. These rulings not only shape the future of agent regulation but also provide much-needed guidance on the compatibility of sport-specific governance with EU competition and internal market law.

Until then, the FFAR remain partially suspended, a high-profile example of the delicate balance between private regulation in sport and compliance with EU legal standards.

We act in all legal aspects of football transfers, including disputes involving football agents, and further information and advice is available from Dr Estelle Ivanova and Dr Lucien Valloni by emailing them at ivanova@valloni.ch and valloni@valloni.ch.